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Abstract
In social choice voting, majorities based on difference of votes and their extension, ma-
jorities based on difference in support, implement the crisp preference values (votes) and
the intensities of preference provided by voters when comparing pairs of alternatives,
respectively. The aim of these rules is declaring which alternative is socially preferred
and to that, they require the winner alternative to reach a certain positive difference
in its social valuation with respect to the one reached by the loser alternative. This
paper introduces a new aggregation rule that extends majorities based on difference of
votes from the context of crisp preferences to the framework of linguistic preferences.
Under linguistic majorities with difference in support, voters express their intensities of
preference between pairs of alternatives using linguistic labels and an alternative defeats
another one when a specific support, fixed before the election process, is reached. There
exist two main representation methodologies of linguistic preferences: the cardinal one
based on the use of fuzzy sets, and the ordinal one based on the use of the 2-tuples.
Linguistic majorities with difference in support are formalised in both representation set-
tings, and conditions are given to guarantee that fuzzy linguistic majorities and 2-tuple
linguistic majorities are mathematically isomorphic. Finally, linguistic majorities based
on difference in support are proved to verify relevant normative properties: anonymity,
neutrality, monotonicity, weak Pareto and cancellativeness.
Keywords: Social choice, Aggregation rule, Linguistic preferences, Linguistic
majorities, Fuzzy sets, 2-tuples, Difference in support.
1. Introduction
Decision making problems deal with the social choice of the best alternative among all
the possible alternatives taking into account the views and opinions, i.e. the preferences,
of all the individuals of a particular social group [10, 34, 38]. Two approaches are possible
to address these problems [24, 26]: a direct approach that derives a social choice from
the sole manipulation and processing of the information provided by all the individuals
without the intermediate derivation of any kind of collective information using a fusion
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or aggregation operator, which is characteristic of the indirect approach. Obviously, the
type of aggregation rule implemented in the second approach is crucial in designing the
corresponding social choice rule, and ultimately in the final social solution to the decision
making problem. This paper deals with this specific issue, and it is devoted to the
introduction of a new aggregation rule for individual preferences.
A comparison study between different alternative preference elicitation methods is
reported in [32], where it was concluded that pairwise comparison methods are more ac-
curate than non-pairwise methods. The main advantage of pairwise comparison methods
is that facilitates individuals expressing their preferences because they focus exclusively
on two alternatives at a time. Given two alternatives, an individual either prefers one to
the other or is indifferent between them, which can be represented using a preference rela-
tion whose elements represent the preference of one alternative over another one. There
exist two main mathematical models to represent pairwise comparison of alternatives
based on the concept of preference relation [10, 35]: in the first one, a preference relation
is defined for each one of the above three possible preference states, which is usually
referred to as a preference structure on the set of alternatives; the second one integrates
the three possible preference states into a single preference relation. This paper deals
with the second type of relations, for which reciprocity of preferences is usually assumed
in order to guarantee the following basic rationality properties in making paired compar-
isons [37]: indifference between any alternative and itself, and asymmetry of preferences,
i.e. if an individual prefers alternative x to y, that individual does not simultaneously
prefer y to x.
In classical voting systems the set of numerical values {1, 0.5, 0}, or its equivalent
{1, 0,−1} [10], is used to represent when the first alternative is preferred to the second
alternative, when both alternatives are considered equally preferred (indifference), and
when the second alternative is preferred to the first one, respectively. This classical pre-
ference modelling constitutes the simplest numeric discrimination model of preferences,
and it proves insufficient in many decision making situations as the following example
illustrates: Let x, y, z be three alternatives of which we know that one individual prefers
x to y and y to z, and another individual prefers z to y and y to x; then using the above
numerical values it may be difficult or impossible to decide which alternative is the best.
As Fishburn points out in [10], if alternative y is closer to the best alternative than to the
worst one for both individuals then it might seem appropriate to ‘elect’ it as the social
choice, whilst if it is closer to the worst than to the best, then it might be excluded from
the choice set. Thus, in many cases it might be necessary the implementation of some
kind of ‘intensity of preference’ between alternatives.
The concept of fuzzy set, which extends the classical concept of set, when applied
to a classical relation leads to the concept of a fuzzy relation, which in turn allows the
implementation of intensity of preferences [42]. In [2], we can find for the first time
the fuzzy interpretation of intensity of preferences via the concept of a reciprocal fuzzy
preference relation, which was later reinterpreted by Nurmi in [33]. In this approach, the
numeric scale to evaluate intensity of preferences is the whole unit interval [0, 1] instead
of {1, 0.5, 0}, which it is argued though to assume unlimited computational abilities and
resources from the individuals [5].
Subjectivity, imprecision and vagueness in the articulation of opinions pervade real
world decision applications, and individuals usually find difficult to evaluate their pre-
ference using exact numbers. Individuals might feel more comfortable using words by
means of linguistic labels or terms to articulate their preferences [44]. Furthermore, hu-
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mans exhibit a remarkable capability to manipulate perceptions and other characteristics
of physical and mental objects, without any exact numerical measurements and complex
computations [4, 12, 25, 29, 45]. Therefore, in this paper, the individuals’ preferences
between pair of alternatives will be assumed to be given in the form of linguistic labels.
It was mentioned before that the type of aggregation rule implemented is crucial
in designing the corresponding social choice rule. This paper focuses on the majority
voting rules, which are very easy to understand by voters and therefore, when comparing
two alternatives, they are seen as very attractive and appropriate to aggregate individual
preferences into a collective one. Simple majority rule [31] stands out among the different
majority rules. Under this rule, an alternative defeats another one when the number of
votes cast for the first one exceeds the number of votes cast for the second one. In
fact, the requirement to declare indifference between two alternatives is quite strong
given that both alternatives have to receive exactly the same number of favourable votes.
Furthermore, under the simple majority rule, the support required for an alternative to
be the winner is minimum because it is only required to exceed the defeated alternative in
just one vote. Being the most decisive aggregation rule turns out to become a drawback
because the collective decision is very unstable, i.e. it could be reverted with the change
of just one vote. In an attempt to overcome this shortcoming, tougher requirements for
declaring an alternative as the winner have been defined and studied. Among these rules,
it is worth mentioning the following: unanimous majority, absolute majority and qualified
majorities [9, 10, 36].
Majorities based on difference of votes (Mk) [14, 23, 27] constitute another general
approach to majority voting rules. These majorities allow to calibrate the amount of
support required for the winner alternative by means of a difference of votes fixed before
the election process. At the extreme cases, i.e. no difference and maximum difference of
votes, majorities based on difference of votes become the simple majority and unanimous
majority, respectively. Moreover, if indifference is ruled out from individual preferences,
they are equivalent to qualified majorities. With these rules, indifference between two
alternatives is possible to be declared for more cases than under the simple majority rule.
In fact, the indifference state could be enlarged as much as desired. The application of
the majorities based on difference of votes to the case of [0,1]–valued reciprocal fuzzy
preference relations is known as the majorities based on difference in support (M˜k) [15].
The aim of this paper is to fill the gap between majorities based on difference of votes
and majorities based on difference in support by providing new majority rules based on
difference of support in the linguistic framework. Linguistic majorities with difference
in support keep the essence of the former rules in the sense that for an alternative to
be declared winner a specific support fixed before the election is to be achieved. The
challenge here is to formally generalise the rules to the case of being the preferences
linguistic rather than numeric in nature. An additional challenge here is to relate the
linguistic majorities with difference in support that can be obtained when the main two
approaches to model and represent linguistic information are applied. On the one hand,
linguistic preferences can be modelled using a cardinal approach by means of fuzzy sets
and their associated membership functions [42]. On the other hand, an ordinal approach
can be used to model and manage linguistic preferences using the 2–tuple symbolic
representation [21]. Therefore, two new and different linguistic majorities with difference
in support will be introduced: the linguistic fuzzy majorities (LMK) and the 2–tuple
linguistic majorities (2TMk). Figure 1 illustrates the new linguistic majorities in relation
with the corresponding ones developed for numerical preferences.
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Crisp preferences [0,1]–valued preferences
Mk–majorities LMK–majorities
2TMk–majorities
M˜k–majorities
Figure 1: Preferences and majorities based on differences
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section introduces
concepts essential to the understanding of the rest of the paper. Following that, Sec-
tion 3 introduces the concept of linguistic majorities with difference in support and their
mathematical formulation for the main two approaches to model and represent linguistic
information: fuzzy set representation (Subsection 3.1) and the 2–tuple symbolic repre-
sentation (Subsection 3.2). Section 4 proves that both linguistic majorities are mathe-
matically isomorphic when fuzzy sets are defuzzified into their centroid. In Section 5,
linguistic majorities based on difference in support are proved to verify the following
relevant normative properties: anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity, weak Pareto and
cancellativeness. Finally, in Section 6 conclusions are drawn and suggestions made for
further work.
2. Preliminaries
Consider m voters provide their preferences on pairs of alternatives of a set X =
{x1, . . . , xn}. The preferences of each voter can be represented using a matrix, Rp =(
rpij
)
, where rpij stands for the degree or intensity of preference of alternative xi over xj for
voter p. The elements of Rp can be numerical values or linguistic labels. In the following
we focus on the former ones, leaving for Subsection 2.3 the second ones.
2.1. Numeric preferences
There are two main types of numeric preference relations: crisp preference relations
and [0,1]–valued preference relations; with the second one being an extension of the first
one, i.e. [0,1]–valued preference relations have crisp relations as a particular case.
1. A crisp preference relation is characterised for having elements rpij that belong to
the discrete set of values {0, 0.5, 1}. In this context, when alternatives are pairwise
compared, voters declare only their preference for one of the alternatives or their
indifference between the two alternatives. Thus, if rpij = 1 then voter p prefers
alternative xi to alternative xj, while if r
p
ij = 0.5 the voter p is indifferent between
both alternatives. Moreover, it is always assumed that when rpij = 0.5 it is also
rpji = 0.5; and when r
p
ij = 1 then r
p
ji = 0. This reciprocity property of preferences
guarantees that preferences are represented by weak orderings, i.e. the asymmetric
property is verified and ‘inconsistent’ situations where a voter could prefer two
alternatives at the same time are avoided. Formally, a binary preference relation
represented by p is asymmetric if given two alternatives xi and xj, xi p xj
implies that xj p xi [11].
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2. The [0,1]–valued preference relation extends the crisp preference relation given that
its elements rpij can take any value from the unit interval [0, 1], with the following
interpretation: rpij > 0.5 indicates that the individual p prefers the alternative xi to
the alternative xj, with r
p
ij = 1 being the maximum degree of preference for xi over
xj; r
p
ij = 0.5 represents indifference between xi and xj for voter p. As in the previ-
ous case, the reciprocity property of preferences, rpij + r
p
ji = 1, is usually assumed
as an extension of the crisp asymmetry property described above. This type of
preference relations will be referred to as reciprocal preference relations in this pa-
per. In probabilistic choice theory, reciprocal preference relations are referred to as
probabilistic binary preference relations. In fuzzy sets theory, reciprocal preference
relations when used to represent intensities of preferences have usually been referred
to as reciprocal fuzzy preference relations [30]. Reciprocal preference relations can
be seen as a particular case of (weakly) complete fuzzy preference relations, i.e.
fuzzy preference relations satisfying rij + rji ≥ 1 ∀i, j [12].
2.2. Majorities based on differences
In an attempt to overcome the support problems commonly attached to the simple
majority rule in decision making contexts with crisp preferences, Garc´ıa-Lapresta and
Llamazares [14] formalise the concept of majorities based on difference of votes or Mk–
majorities, which was later axiomatically characterised in [23, 27].
Definition 1 (Mk–majorities). Given k ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}, and a profile of individual
crisp preferences (R1, . . . , Rm) on a set of alternatives X = {x1, . . . , xn}, the Mk–majority
is a mapping from X ×X to {1, 0.5, 0}, with the following expression:
Mk(xi, xj) =

1 if mij > mji + k;
0 if mji > mij + k;
0.5 otherwise;
where mij is the number of votes cast by the individuals for the alternative xi when
compared with alternative xj and mji is the number of votes cast for the alternative xj.
Thus, under Mk–majorities, given a difference of votes k, an alternative, xi, defeats
another alternative, xj, by k votes (Mk(xi, xj) = 1) when the difference between the
votes cast for the alternative xi and the votes cast for the alternative xj is greater than k.
Compared with the simple majority rule, the main change introduced by the majorities
based on difference of votes affects the indifference state. The indifference of preference
between two alternatives happens when the difference between the votes cast for both
alternatives in absolute value is lower than or equal to k, i.e. when the difference of votes
belongs to {0, 1, . . . , k}.
Example 1. Consider nine voters (m = 9) expressing their preferences between two al-
ternatives, (x1, x2), using the following profile of crisp preferences (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.5, 1, 1, 1).
In this case, we observe that five voters prefer alternative x2 (m21 = 5), three voters
prefer alternative x1 (m12 = 3), while one voter is indifferent between both alternatives.
Under simple majority rule x1 would not be the winner alternative (m12 < m21) but
x2. Simple majority rule corresponds by Definition 1 to M0. We clearly see that under
5
Mk–majorities x1 is never declared the winner alternative (no matter the value of k), i.e.
Mk(x1, x2) 6= 1 ∀k. Indeed, for this crisp preference profile we have the following:
Mk(x1, x2) =
{
0 if k ∈ {0, 1};
0.5 otherwise.
Thus, when the difference of votes is set to be k ∈ {0, 1} we have that x2 collectively de-
feats x1, otherwise there exists a collective indifference between both alternatives. Unan-
imous majority rule requires that all voters prefer one alternative to the other one. In
our example this is only possible when (m12,m21) ∈ {(9, 0), (0, 9)}, which corresponds to
the Mk–majority rule with k = 8(= m− 1).
Mk–majorities generalise other majority rules as the previous example has shown.
Indeed, we have that M0–majority is the simple majority rule, whereas M(m−1)–majority
is the unanimous majority rule. Moreover, Mk–majorities and qualified majorities, which
are located between absolute majority and unanimity, are equivalent when individual
indifference is ruled out from individual preferences [14]. These facts are summarised in
Figure 2.
Absolute majoritySimple majority
k = 0
Unanimous majority
k = m− 1
Mk–majorities
Qualified majorities
Figure 2: Mk–majorities versus other majorities
Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares [15] extend Mk–majorities to the framework of [0, 1]–
valued preferences. Majorities based on difference in support or M˜k–majorities allow
voters to show their preferences between pairs of alternatives through reciprocal prefe-
rence relations whilst still maintaining the requirement of a higher support to the winner
alternative than with the simple majority rule. Under M˜k–majorities, an alternative, xi,
defeats another one, xj, by a threshold of support k, when the sum of the intensities of
preference of xi over xj for the m voters exceeds the sum of the intensities of preference
of xj over xi in a quantity greater than k.
Definition 2 (M˜k–majorities). Given a threshold k ∈ [0,m) and a profile of individual
reciprocal preference relations (R1, . . . , Rm), the M˜k–majority is a mapping from X ×X
to {1, 0.5, 0}, with the following expression:
M˜k(xi, xj) =

1 if
m∑
p=1
rpij >
m∑
p=1
rpji + k;
0 if
m∑
p=1
rpji >
m∑
p=1
rpij + k;
0.5 otherwise.
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With M˜k–majorities, indifference between two alternatives happens when the difference
in support between the alternatives in absolute value is lower than or equal to k, i.e. it
is a value in the closed interval [0, k].
A direct consequence of the reciprocity property is that M˜k–majorities can be equiv-
alently expressed in terms of the average of individual intensities of preference [15]:
M˜k(xi, xj) =

1 if 1
m
m∑
p=1
rpij >
m+k
2m
;
0 if 1
m
m∑
p=1
rpij <
m−k
2m
;
0.5 otherwise.
(1)
The term 1
m
m∑
p=1
rpij can be interpreted as the collective preference (the average of all the
votes) of the first alternative, xi, over the second one, xj. Under the M˜k–majorities,
the indifference between two alternatives does not necessarily happen when the collective
preference, expressed in terms of the arithmetic mean of the individual preferences, equals
the value 0.5. M˜k–majorities declare indifference when the collective preference belongs
to the closed interval
[
0.5− k
2m
, 0.5 +
k
2m
]
, which we refer to as the indifference interval.
When the collective preference is greater than the upper bound of the indifference interval,
the first alternative is preferred to the second one. On the other hand, when the collective
preference is lower than the lower bound of the indifference interval, the second alternative
is preferred to the first one. In comparison with the simple majority rule, the M˜k–
majorities promote an increase on the cases where the collective indifference is declared,
which depends on the threshold of support required to define the strict preference state.
Example 2. Consider the previous nine voters of Example 1 express their preferences
between two alternatives, (x1, x2), using the following profile of [0, 1]–valued preferences
(0.1, 0.25, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4, 0.5, 0.9, 0.9, 0.9). This profile of [0, 1]–valued preferences represents
the same preference states as that of the profile of crisp preferences of Example 1: five
voters prefer alternative x2, three voters prefer alternative x1, while one voter is indifferent
between both alternatives. The solution to the equation
1
m
m∑
p=1
rp12 =
m+ k
2m
⇔ 4.75
9
=
9 + k
18
is k = 0.5, and we have
M˜k(x1, x2) =
{
1 if k ∈ [0, 0.5);
0.5 otherwise.
Notice that with the implementation of intensities of preference, M˜k–majorities pro-
duce different collective preference outputs than the ones under Mk–majorities in the
corresponding crisp preference case. Indeed, in this case alternative x2 never defeats al-
ternative x1 and, on the contrary, alternative x1 can defeat alternative x2 if the difference
in support is set to be lower than 0.5. This means that alternative x1 would be the
winner under simple majority rule, which is not the case in the corresponding crisp pre-
ference case of Example 1. It is worth mentioning here that three of the five experts that
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prefer alternative x2 to alternative x1 are indicating a slightly preference that is close to
indifference. In contrast, the three voters preferring alternative x1 over x2 are doing this
with an intensity degree close to the maximum. We observe that the implementation of
intensities of preference in deriving majority preferences with difference in support allows
for a more precise discrimination than if it were not taken into account.
2.3. Linguistic preferences
As mentioned before, subjectivity, imprecision and vagueness in the articulation of
opinions pervade real world decision applications, and individuals might feel more com-
fortable using words by means of linguistic labels or terms to articulate their preferences
[44]. In these cases is still valid the following quotation by Zadeh [45]: ‘Since words,
in general, are less precise than numbers, the concept of a linguistic variable serves the
purpose of providing a means of approximate characterisation of phenomena which are
too complex or too ill-defined to be amenable to description in conventional quantitative
terms.’
Let L = {l0, . . . , ls} be a set of linguistic labels (s ≥ 2), with semantic underlying a
ranking relation that can be precisely captured with a linear order, i.e., l0 < l1 < · · · <
ls. Table 1 provides an example with seven linguistic labels and their corresponding
semantic meanings for the comparison of the ordered pair of alternatives (xi, xj).
Linguistic label Semantic meaning
l0 xj is absolutely preferred to xi
l1 xj is highly preferred to xi
l2 xj is slightly preferred to xi
l3 xi and xj are equally preferred
l4 xi is slightly preferred to xj
l5 xi is highly preferred to xj
l6 xi is absolutely preferred to xj
Table 1: Seven linguistic labels and their semantic meanings
Assuming that the number of labels is odd and the central label ls/2 stands for the in-
difference state when comparing two alternatives, the remaining labels are usually located
symmetrically around that central assessment, which guarantees that a kind of reciprocity
property holds as in the case of numerical preferences previously discussed. Thus, if the
linguistic assessment associated to the pair of alternatives (xi, xj) is lij = lh ∈ L, then the
linguistic assessment corresponding to the pair of alternatives (xj, xi) would be lji = ls−h.
Therefore, the operator defined as N(lh) = lg with (g + h) = s is a negator operator
because N (N(lh)) = N(lg) = lh.
The corresponding matrix notation of linguistic individual preferences of voter p is
Rp = (lpij) with l
p
ij ∈ L. A profile of linguistic preferences for the pair of alternatives
(xi, xj) is the vector of its associated linguistic preferences given by a set of m voters,
(l1ij, . . . , l
m
ij ) ∈ Lm. The main two representation formats of linguistic information are
[22]: the cardinal, which is based on the use of fuzzy set characterised with membership
functions and that are mathematically processed using Zadeh’s extension principle [44];
and the ordinal, which is based on the use of 2-tuples symbolic methodology [21].
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2.3.1. Fuzzy set linguistic representation format
Convex normal fuzzy subsets of the real line, also known as fuzzy numbers, are com-
monly used to represent linguistic terms. By doing this, each linguistic assessment is
represented using a fuzzy number that is characterised by a membership function, with
base variable the unit interval [0, 1], describing its semantic meaning. The membership
function maps each value in [0, 1] to a degree of performance representing its compatibil-
ity with the linguistic assessment [44]. Figure 3 illustrates a fuzzy number with Gaussian
membership function.
0 0.43 0.5 0.57 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
µτ
Figure 3: Representation of a fuzzy number with Gaussian membership function
It is worth mentioning that some authors consider trapezoidal fuzzy numbers as the
most appropriate to represent linguistic preferences [7, 16] because they are more general
than triangular and interval fuzzy numbers. Given four real numbers t1, t2, t3, t4, a
trapezoidal fuzzy number (TFN) τ = (t1, t2, t3, t4) is characterised by the following
membership function:
µτ (u) =

0 if u ≤ t1 or u ≥ t4;
u− t1
t2 − t1 if t1 < u < t2;
1 if t2 ≤ u ≤ t3;
t4 − u
t4 − t3 if t3 < u < t4.
(2)
A representation of a set of seven balanced linguistic terms using trapezoidal fuzzy
numbers is given in Figure 4. Alternative representations are possible. For instance
in [20], absolute preference of one alternative over another is represented using crisp
values: l0 = (0, 0, 0, 0) and l6 = (1, 1, 1, 1).
2.3.2. 2–tuple linguistic representation format
Linguistic assessments can also be represented and aggregated using symbolic repre-
sentation models based on an ordinal interpretation of the semantic meaning associated
to the linguistic labels. Within this framework, the following different approaches have
being developed: a linguistic symbolic computational model based on ordinal scales and
max-min operators [40], a linguistic symbolic computational model based on indexes
[8, 39].
In Herrera and Mart´ınez [21], a more general approach was introduced: the 2–tuple
linguistic model. This linguistic model takes as a basis the symbolic representation model
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0
1
Figure 4: Representation of seven balanced linguistic terms with trapezoidal membership functions
based on indexes and in addition defines the concept of symbolic translation to represent
the linguistic information by means of a pair of values called linguistic 2–tuple, (lb, λb),
where lb ∈ L is one of the original linguistic terms and λb is a numeric value representing
the symbolic translation. This representation structure allows, on the one hand, to obtain
the same information than with the symbolic representation model based on indexes
without losing information in the aggregation phase. On the other hand, the result of
the aggregation is expressed on the same domain as the one of the initial linguistic labels
and therefore, the well-known re-translation problem of the above methods is avoided.
Definition 3 (Linguistic 2–tuple representation). Let a ∈ [0, s] be the result of a
symbolic aggregation of the indexes of a set of labels assessed in a linguistic term set
L = {l0, . . . , ls}. Let b = round(a) ∈ {0, . . . , s}. The value λb = a − b ∈ [−0.5, 0.5) is
called a symbolic translation, and the pair of values (lb, λb) is called the 2–tuple linguistic
representation of the symbolic aggregation a.
The 2–tuple linguistic representation of symbolic aggregation can be mathematically
formalised with the following mapping:
φ : [0, s] −→ L × [−0.5, 0.5)
φ(a) = (lb, λb).
(3)
Based on the linear order of the linguistic term set and the complete ordering of the set
[−0.5, 0.5), it is easy to prove that φ is strictly increasing and continuous and, therefore
its inverse function exists:
φ−1 : L × [−0.5, 0.5) −→ [0, s]
φ−1(lb, λb) = b+ λb = a.
(4)
The following negation operator is defined: N(φ(a)) = φ(s− a). Figure 5 illustrates the
application of the 2–tuple function φ and its inverse for a linguistic term set of cardinality
seven. The value of the symbolic translation is assumed to be 3.7, which means that
round(3.7) = 4 and therefore it can be represented with the 2–tuple (l4,−0, 3).
3. Linguistic majorities with difference in support
Before majorities based on difference in support in the context of linguistic preferences
are defined, we need to introduce the linguistic decision rule concept. Recall that a profile
of linguistic preferences for a pair of alternatives alternatives (xi, xj) is a vector of its
associated linguistic preferences given by a set of m voters (l1ij, . . . , l
m
ij ) ∈ Lm.
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a = 3.7 (lb, λb) = (l4,−0.3)
φ
φ−1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 5: Ordinal linguistic representation: symbolic translation and 2–tuples
Definition 4. Given a pair of alternatives (xi, xj) ∈ X ×X, a linguistic decision rule is
a mapping
F : Lm −→ {0, 0.5, 1},
such that:
F (l1ij, . . . , l
m
ij ) =

1 if xi defeats xj;
0 if xj defeats xi;
0.5 if xi and xj tie.
The generalisation of the majorities based on difference of votes from the context of
numerical preferences to the context of linguistic preferences involves: (1) the compu-
tation of the voters average linguistic assessment for a pair of alternatives, and (2) the
evaluation of the difference between two linguistic evaluations. In the following, we will
formalise this in both linguistic representation methodologies.
3.1. Fuzzy linguistic majorities with difference in support
In what follows, A˜pij denotes the normal and convex fuzzy set representing the lin-
guistic preference of alternative xi over xj provided by voter p. As mentioned before,
the formalisation of the fuzzy linguistic majorities with difference in support requires the
computation of the average fuzzy linguistic preference,
1
m
m∑
p=1
A˜pij, of a profile of linguistic
preferences
(
A˜1ij, . . . , A˜
m
ij
)
.
The extension principle allows the domain of a functional mapping to be extended
from crisp elements to fuzzy sets as given below [19, 44].
Definition 5 (Extension Principle). Let X1 ×X2 × · · · ×Xn be a universal product
set and F a functional mapping of the form
F : X1 ×X2 × · · · ×Xn −→ Y
that maps the element (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ X1 × X2 × · · · × Xn to the element y =
F (x1, x2, . . . , xn) of the universal set Y . Let Ai be a fuzzy set over the universal set
Xi with membership function µAi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). The membership function µB of the
fuzzy set B = F (A1, . . . , An) over the universal set Y is
µB(y) =

sup
y=F (x1,x2,...,xn)
[µA1(x1) ∗ µA2(x2) ∗ · · · ∗ µAn(xn)]
if ∃ x1, . . . , xn : y = F (x1, . . . , xn);
0 otherwise;
(5)
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where ∗ is a t-norm.
For the work presented in this paper, the minimum t-norm (∧) is used.
In what follows we will first extend the real function f : [0, 1]× [0, 1] −→ [0, 1],
f(u1, u2) = u1 + u2,
to f(A˜1, A˜2) where A˜1, A˜2 are fuzzy sets over the set [0, 1] with associated membership
functions µA˜1 , µA˜2 . The extension principle states that B˜ = f(A˜1, A˜2) is a fuzzy set over
the set [0, 1] with membership function µB˜ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1];
µB˜(u) = sup
u1+u2=u
u1,u2∈[0,1]
[
µA˜1(u1) ∧ µA˜2(u2)
]
.
The representation theorem of fuzzy sets [44] provides an alternative and convenient
way to define a fuzzy set via its corresponding family of crisp α–level sets. The α–level
set of a fuzzy set A˜ over the universe Z is defined as A˜α = {z ∈ Z | µA˜(z) ≥ α}. The set
of crisp sets {A˜α | 0 < α ≤ 1} is said to be a representation of the fuzzy set A˜. Indeed,
the fuzzy set A˜ can be represented as
A˜ = ∪
0<α≤1
αA˜α,
where αA˜α is the scalar product of α with the set A˜α. The membership function of A˜ is
as follows:
µA˜(z) = sup
α: z∈A˜α
α.
More details about the representation theorem of fuzzy sets can be found in [44].
Let A˜α1 and A˜
α
2 be the α–level sets of fuzzy sets A˜1 and A˜2 described above. We have
f
(
A˜α1 , A˜
α
2
)
=
{
u1 + u2 | u1 ∈ A˜α1 , u2 ∈ A˜α2
}
.
Both B˜α and f
(
A˜α1 , A˜
α
2
)
are crisp sets. Furthermore, as we prove next, we have the
following equality:
B˜α = f
(
A˜α1 , A˜
α
2
)
. (6)
I. Let u ∈ B˜α. By definition, we have µB˜(u) ≥ α and there exist at least two values
u1, u2 ∈ [0, 1] such that u1 + u2 = u and
[
µA˜1(u1) ∧ µA˜2(u2)
] ≥ α. Therefore, it is
true that µA˜1(u1) ≥ α and µA˜2(u2) ≥ α, which means that u1 ∈ A˜α1 and u2 ∈ A˜α2 .
Consequently, u ∈ f
(
A˜α1 , A˜
α
2
)
, i.e. B˜α ⊆ f
(
A˜α1 , A˜
α
2
)
.
II. Let u ∈ f
(
A˜α1 , A˜
α
2
)
. There exist u1 ∈ A˜α1 and u2 ∈ A˜α2 such that u1 + u2 = u. We
have that µA˜1(u1) ≥ α and µA˜2(u2) ≥ α and therefore it is:
sup
u1+u2=u
u1∈A˜α1 ,u2∈A˜α2
[
µA˜1(u1) ∧ µA˜2(u2)
] ≥ α.
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Because A˜α1 , A˜
α
2 ⊆ [0, 1], we have:
sup
u1+u2=u
u1,u2∈[0,1]
[
µA˜1(u1) ∧ µA˜2(u2)
] ≥ sup
u1+u2=u
u1∈A˜α1 ,u2∈A˜α2
[
µA˜1(u1) ∧ µA˜2(u2)
]
.
We conclude that u ∈ B˜α, i.e. f
(
A˜α1 , A˜
α
2
)
⊆ B˜α.
A similar reasoning will lead us to conclude that the α–level set of the average of
fuzzy numbers is equal to the average of the α–level set of fuzzy sets [47]. Denoting
f
(
A˜α1 , A˜
α
2
)
= A˜α1 + A˜
α
2 , it is safe to use the following notation
B˜ = A˜1 + A˜2 ⇐⇒
(
A˜1 + A˜2
)α
= A˜α1 + A˜
α
2 .
The α–level sets of fuzzy numbers are closed intervals, and therefore interval arithmetic
yields: (
A˜1 + A˜2
)α
= A˜α1 + A˜
α
2 = [u
−
1 , u
+
1 ] + [u
−
2 , u
+
2 ] = [u
−
1 + u
−
2 , u
+
1 + u
+
2 ].
An example of the addition using the α–level sets is shown in Figure 6. Given the fuzzy
numbers l3 and l4 (Figure 4), l3 + l4 is constructed by applying (6) to compute the lower
and upper bounds of its α–level sets, followed by the application of the representation
theorem of fuzzy sets. The computation of the lower bound of the 0.2–level set is given.
0 0.386 0.553 0.939 2
0
0.2
1
l3 l4 l3 + l4
Real numbers
α–level
Figure 6: α–level addition of linguistic terms
Once we have solved the computation of the average linguistic preference of the pro-
file of linguistic preferences associated to a pair of alternatives, the formalisation of fuzzy
linguistic majorities with difference in support requires its classification regarding its
containment in one of the intervals corresponding to the social preference or social in-
difference established by the value of k. In other words, we need to find out when the
following inequality
1
m
m∑
p=1
A˜pij >
m+ k
2m
is true or when it is false. Because crisp numbers
are particular types of fuzzy numbers, the above inequality involves the comparison of
fuzzy numbers. Yager [41] pointed out that this problem has been extensively studied
and that there is no unique best approach. Indeed, the set of fuzzy numbers is not totally
ordered and therefore it is not possible to achieve a clear social decision in this case. This
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is clearly illustrated in Figure 7, where two different aggregated fuzzy set are displayed,
namely B˜1 and B˜2. Because B˜1 completely belongs to one of the intervals of preference
there is no doubt about the social decision, which in the illustrated case implies that
alternative xj defeats alternative xi with a different in support k. A similar conclusion
would derive if the fuzzy set complete belongs the interval of indifference between both
alternatives. On the contrary, the case represented by B˜2 is ambiguous given that such set
is located in between the interval of preference for xi and the indifference state. Thus, a
different approach is needed if we are to provide a clear cut social choice as per Definition
4.
0 m−k
2m
0.5 m+k
2m
1
0
1
B˜1
xi Ik xjxj Pk xi xi Pk xj
µ
0
1
0 m−k
2m
0.5 m+k
2m
1
0
1
B˜2
xi Ik xjxj Pk xi xi Pk xj
µ
0
1
Figure 7: Comparison between aggregated fuzzy sets and preference–indifference states
A widely used approach to rank fuzzy numbers consists in converting them into a rep-
resentative crisp value, and perform the comparison on them, a methodology originally
proposed by Zadeh in [43]. This approach has been proposed and used in the selection
process of decision making problems under uncertainty where ranking of fuzzy or intu-
itionistic fuzzy sets is a must to arrive at a decision [41]. Recently, a study by Brunelli
and Mezei [3] that compares different ranking methods for fuzzy numbers concludes that
‘it is impossible to give a final answer to the question on what ranking method is the
best. Most of the time choosing a method rather than another is a matter of preference
or is context dependent.’ Two defuzzification methods widely used in fuzzy set theory
are: the centre of area method (COA) and the mean of maximum method (MOM). The
first one computes the centre of mass of the membership function of the fuzzy set (the
centroid), whereas the second one computes the mid-point of the 1–level set of the fuzzy
set. The COA method maintains the underlying semantic ranking relation within the
set of linguistic labels as discussed before, i.e. given two linguistic labels li, lj ∈ L such
that li < lj then uCOA(li) < uCOA(lj), and therefore its use is proposed in the approach
presented here. It is worth mentioning Brunelli and Mezei’s correlation study, and their
centrality analysis associated to the corresponding correlation network representation,
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which shows the centre of area method as one of the highest central defuzzification meth-
ods. Furthermore, for a trapezoidal fuzzy number A˜ with membership function (2), we
have uCOA(A˜) =
t1 + t4
2
and under the assumed property of internal symmetry of the
linguistic labels it is uCOA ≡ uMOM . From now on, we refer to the centre of area value of
fuzzy number A˜ simply as u(A˜). Given two trapezoidal fuzzy numbers, namely A˜1 and
A˜2, it holds that u(A˜1 + A˜2) = u(A˜1) + u(A˜2). Hence, u is an additive function.
The range of function u is [u(l0), u(ls)], while the range of
m+ k
2m
is [0, 1]. Thus, to
carry out a fair comparison in the formalisation of the linguistic majority with difference
in support, the following function v with range [0, 1] is used:
v(A˜) =
u(A˜) − u(l0)
u(ls) − u(l0) .
Below, we formally define linguistic majorities with difference in support represented
by fuzzy sets. Under these rules, an alternative, xi, defeats another one, xj, by a threshold
of support K, if the defuzzified value of the average fuzzy set of the voters’ linguistic
valuations between xi and xj exceeds the value 0.5 in a quantity that depends on the
threshold K, fixed before the election process.
Definition 6 (LMK–majorities with difference in support). Given a set of alter-
natives X and a profile of individual reciprocal fuzzy linguistic preference relations
R(X) = (R1, . . . , Rm), the LMK–majorities with difference in support are the follow-
ing linguistic decision rules:
LMK(A˜
1
ij, . . . , A˜
m
ij ) =

1 if v
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
A˜pij
)
> m+K
2m
;
0 if v
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
A˜pij
)
< m−K
2m
;
0.5 otherwise;
(7)
where v
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
A˜pij
)
is the defuzzified value of the fuzzy average linguistic preference of
the profile of fuzzy linguistic preferences of the pair of alternatives (xi, xj); and K ∈ [0, m)
represents the threshold of support required for an alternative to be the social winner.
In the following result we prove that function v is additive.
Proposition 1. Function v verifies
v
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
A˜pij
)
=
1
m
m∑
p=1
v(A˜pij).
Proof. Because u is additive we have that
u
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
A˜pij
)
=
1
m
m∑
p=1
u(A˜pij).
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Also, we have that u and v are related in the form u = c · v + d where c = u(ls) − u(l0)
and d = u(l0), it is:
u
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
A˜pij
)
= c · v
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
A˜pij
)
+ d,
u
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
A˜pij
)
=
1
m
m∑
p=1
u(A˜pij) =
1
m
m∑
p=1
[
c · v(A˜pij) + d
]
= c · 1
m
m∑
p=1
v(A˜pij) + d.
Thus, we have:
v
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
A˜pij
)
=
1
m
m∑
p=1
v(A˜pij),
i.e. v is additive.
Expression (7) can be rewritten as follows:
LMK(A˜
1
ij, . . . , A˜
m
ij ) =

1 if 1
m
m∑
p=1
v(A˜pij) >
m+K
2m
;
0 if 1
m
m∑
p=1
v(A˜pij) <
m−K
2m
;
0.5 otherwise;
(8)
where K ∈ [0, m) and 1
m
m∑
p=1
v(A˜pij) is the average of the defuzzified values associated
with the profile of fuzzy linguistic preferences of the pair of alternatives (xi, xj) as per
the assessment of each individual voter.
It was mentioned before that the linguistic labels are located symmetrically around
the central label ls/2 and therefore it is also appropriate to assume that the membership
functions defining the fuzzy linguistic labels result in centroids symmetrically distributed
with respect to the centroid of the central label. Because the central fuzzy linguistic
label ls/2 stands for the indifference state when comparing two alternatives, it is also
appropriate to have 0.5 as its centroid. Thus, denoting the centroid of fuzzy linguistic
label lk by u(lh) we have that u(l0) + u(ls) = 1 and
u(lh) = u(l0) + h · 1− 2 · u(l0)
s
,
which guarantees an evenly distribution of the centroids of the fuzzy linguistic labels
around the value 0.5. In this context, the application of function v results in
v(lh) =
h
s
. (9)
In the following, we provide an example to illustrate the application of the LMK–
majorities with difference in support.
Example 3. Consider nine voters expressing their preferences between two alternatives,
(x1, x2), using the linguistic labels of Table 1 represented by a set of balanced trapezoidal
fuzzy numbers as illustrated in Figure 4 and verifying (9). Assume the voters provide the
fuzzy linguistic profile of Table 2.
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Linguistic label v(lh)
l0 0
l1 1/6
l2 1/3
l3 0.5
l4 2/3
l5 5/6
l6 1
Table 2: Linguistic labels and centroids of their fuzzy trapezoidal membership functions
In Table 3 two different LMK–majorities with difference in support are computed:
the simple linguistic majority LM0, and LM3.
K v
(
1
m
∑m
p=1 A˜
p
12
)
= 1
m
∑m
p=1 v
(
A˜p12
)
m+K
2m
LMK
0
3
v
(
l0 + l1 + l2 + l2 + l2 + l3 + l6 + l6 + l6
9
)
= 14/27
0.5
2/3
1
0.5
Table 3: Aggregation and results for two different LMK–majorities
In the first case, it is enough to have an average centroid of the fuzzy linguistic profile
greater than the centroid (0.5) of the central fuzzy linguistic assessment (l3) to declare x1
the social winner alternative. In the second case, the threshold required implies that the
average centroid of the fuzzy linguistic profile is to be greater than the centroid of the
fuzzy linguistic label l4 for x1 to be declared the social winner alternative. In the first
case, we have that x1 can indeed be declared the social LM0 winner alternative, whilst
there is social LM3 indifference in the second case.
The LMK–majorities with difference in support for this particular fuzzy linguistic pro-
file have an expression similar to the one achieved for the case of [0, 1]–valued preferences,
being as follows:
LMK(l0, l1, l2, l2, l2, l3, l6, l6, l6) =
{
1 if K ∈ [0, 1/3);
0.5 otherwise.
The following observations are worth highlighting:
(i) LMK–majorities with difference in support generalise the simple linguistic major-
ity [13]. Indeed, LM0–majority coincides with the simple majority based on lin-
guistic labels. In this case, no difference of support between the alternatives is
required.
(ii) Linguistic unanimity holds when all the voters involved in the election prefer the
same alternative, even when their intensities of preference could differ from one to
another. The following three linguistic profiles with nine voters and a set of seven
linguistic terms will serve to illustrate this concept.
(l0, l0, l0, l1, l1, l1, l2, l2, l2); (l6, l6, l6, l6, l6, l6, l6, l6, l6); (l0, l0, l0, l0, l0, l0, l0, l0, l3).
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The first two profiles fulfill linguistic unanimity: in the first one all nine voters
express a preference for the second alternative, whilst in the second one the first
alternative is preferred by all nine voters. However, in the third profile there is
no unanimity of preferences because voter 9 expresses indifference between both
alternatives and therefore differs from the rest of voters, who strongly prefer the
second alternative.
Given a profile of fuzzy linguistic preferences (A˜1ij, . . . , A˜
m
ij ), linguistic unanimity
happens if v(A˜pij) ≤ v(l s2−1) ∀p, or v(A˜
p
ij) ≥ v(l s2+1) ∀p. In the first case, all
voters prefer the second alternative over the first one, whilst the first alternative is
preferred over the second one in the second case. Algebraic manipulation leads us
to the following threshold values: K < m− 2m · v(l s
2
−1) for the social preference of
the second alternative, and K < 2m · v(l s
2
+1) −m for the social preference of the
first alternative.
Because we are assuming that the linguistic labels are symmetrical and balanced
around the central one, then if the fuzzy sets used to represent them are all of the
same type and uniformly distributed in the domain [0, 1], the normalised centroid
function v would be v(lh) = h/s ∀h, and therefore the threshold value to assure
linguistic unanimity would be K < 2m/s.
3.2. 2–tuple linguistic majorities with difference in support
In order to extend the Mk–majorities to the framework of the 2–tuple, the addition
as well as a rule to compare 2–tuples are needed.
Definition 7 (2–tuple Addition [21]). The addition of 2–tuples, φ(a1) = (lb1 , λb1)
and φ(a2) = (lb2 , λb2), with b1 = round(a1), b2 = round(a2), λb1 = a1 − b1 and
λb2 = a2 − b2, is computed as follows:
φ(a1) + φ(a2) = (lb12 , λb12),
with b12 = round(a1 + a2), and λb12 = (a1 + a2)− b12.
Definition 8 (2–tuple Lexicographic Ordering [21]). Given φ(a1) = (lb1 , λb1) and
φ(a2) = (lb2 , λb2), we have that:
1. if b1 is greater than b2, then φ(a1) > φ(a2).
2. if b1 is equal to b2 and λb1 is greater than λb1 , then φ(a1) > φ(a2).
3. if b1 is equal to b2 and λb1 is equal to λb1 , then φ(a1) = φ(a2).
Below, we formally define 2–tuple linguistic majorities with difference in support.
Under these rules, an alternative, xi, defeats another one, xj, by a threshold of support k,
if the 2–tuple linguistic representation of the average symbolic aggregation of the linguistic
preferences of xi over xj exceeds the 2–tuple linguistic representation associated to the
indifference state in a value that depends on the threshold k, fixed before the election
process.
18
Definition 9 (2TMk–majorities with difference in support). Given a set of alter-
natives X and a profile of individual reciprocal 2–tuple linguistic preference relations
(R1, . . . , Rm), the 2TMk–majority with difference in support is the following linguistic
decision rule:
2TMk(a
1
ij, . . . , a
m
ij ) =

1 if 1
m
m∑
p=1
φ
(
apij
)
> φ
(
s ·m+ k
2m
)
;
0 if 1
m
m∑
p=1
φ
(
apij
)
< φ
(
s ·m− k
2m
)
;
0.5 otherwise;
(10)
where
1
m
m∑
p=1
φ
(
apij
)
is the average of the 2–tuple representation of the linguistic prefer-
ences provided by the voters for the pair of alternatives (xi, xj), φ is the 2–tuple symbolic
aggregation mapping (3); and k ∈ [0, m · s) represents the threshold of support required
for an alternative to be the social winner.
In the context of the 2–tuple linguistic representation, the linguistic label lh is associ-
ated a valuation that coincides with its ordering position within L, i.e. h, and therefore
the maximum social preference value a set of voters can assign to an alternative when com-
pared against another one is m · s, which corresponds to the linguistic profile (ls, . . . , ls).
This explains why [0, m · s) is the range of values for parameter k.
Given that in the ordinal representation of linguistic information the addition of lin-
guistic labels is defined as la1 + la2 = la1+a2 [39], it is obvious that function φ is additive.
Therefore expression (10) can be rewritten as follows:
2TMk(a
1
ij, . . . , a
m
ij ) =

1 if φ
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij
)
> φ
(
s ·m+ k
2m
)
;
0 if φ
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij
)
< φ
(
s ·m− k
2m
)
;
0.5 otherwise;
(11)
where
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij is the symbolic aggregation, specifically the arithmetic mean, of the
linguistic preferences provided by the voters for the pair of alternatives (xi, xj).
The following example illustrates the use of the 2TMk–majorities with difference in
support.
Example 4 (Example 3 continuation). Table 4 presents the results for two different
2TMk–majorities: 2TM0 and 2TM18. In the first one, the alternative x1 is declared the
winner when the 2–tuple representation of the symbolic arithmetic mean of the linguistic
preferences provided by the voters for the pair of alternatives (x1, x2) is greater than
the indifference 2–tuple (l3, 0); while it has to be greater than the 2–tuple (l4, 0) in the
second case.
The 2TMk–majorities with difference in support for this particular linguistic profile
is as follows:
2TMk(l0, l1, l2, l2, l2, l3, l6, l6, l6) =
{
1 if k ∈ [0, 2);
0.5 otherwise.
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k 1
m
m∑
p=1
ap12 φ
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
ap12
)
φ
(
s·m+k
2m
)
2TMk
0
18
(0 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 3 + 6 + 6 + 6)/9 = 28/9 (l3, 1/9)
(l3, 0)
(l4, 0)
1
0.5
Table 4: Aggregation and results for two different 2TMk–majorities
Examples 3 and 4 let us hypothesise that LMK–majority and 2TMk–majority coincide
when the following relationship holds K = k/s. This will be proved in the following
section.
4. Equivalence between LMK and 2TMk majorities with difference in support
So far, we have provided two apparently different extensions of Mk–majorities to the
framework of the linguistic preferences. In this section, we prove that LMK and 2TMk
are equivalent.
Let lh ∈ L be a linguistic label, u(lh) its associated centroid following the fuzzy
set linguistic representation introduced in Subsection 2.3.1, and ah = φ
−1 ((lh, 0)) the
symbolic representation of the 2–tuple (lh, 0) as defined in (4). Let δ be the function that
maps ah into v(lh), i.e.
δ (ah) = v(lh). (12)
Under these conditions, δ as defined in (12) is the restriction of a continuous and strictly
increasing function with domain [0, s]:
δ : [0, s] −→ [0, 1]
such that δ(0) = 0, δ(s/2) = 0.5 and δ(s) = 1.
Theorem 1 (LMK and 2TMk Equivalence). If δ is additive then LMK–majorities and
2TMk–majorities are equivalent.
Proof. The following results is well known: if a continuous function verifies F (x + y) =
F (x) + F (y) ∀x, y ∈ R then there exists a constant a ∈ R such that F (x) = a · x ∀x ∈ R
[1]. This result applied to function δ implies that δ(x) = x/s. Therefore we have:
1
m
m∑
p=1
v(A˜pij) >
m+K
2m
⇔ 1
m
m∑
p=1
δ
(
apij
)
>
m+K
2m
,
i.e.
1
m
m∑
p=1
v(A˜pij) >
m+K
2m
⇔ 1
m
m∑
p=1
apij >
s ·m+ s ·K
2m
.
We conclude that LMK–majorities is equivalent to 2TMk–majorities when k = s ·K.
Theorem 1 establishes the condition for LMK–majorities and 2TMk–majorities to be
mathematically isomorphic: δ(x) = x/s. Notice that in Subsection 3.1 we proved that
v is additive and that under the assumption of symmetric distribution of the linguistic
labels with respect to the central assessment it is v(lh) = h/s, which allows us to conclude
that LMK–majorities and 2TMk–majorities are indeed equivalent when the membership
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functions of the fuzzy linguistic labels result in an evenly distribution of the centroids
of the fuzzy linguistic labels. In the following section we prove a number of normative
properties for the 2TMk–majorities with difference in support, which obviously apply to
the LMK–majorities using the proved equivalence.
5. Properties of linguistic majorities with difference in support
For convenience, we use expression (10) for 2TMk–majorities with difference in sup-
port:
2TMk(a
1
ij, . . . , a
p
ij) =

1 if 1
m
m∑
p=1
φ
(
apij
)
> φ
(
s ·m+ k
2m
)
;
0 if 1
m
m∑
p=1
φ
(
apij
)
< φ
(
s ·m− k
2m
)
;
0.5 otherwise;
where
1
m
m∑
p=1
φ
(
apij
)
is the average of the 2–tuple representation of the linguistic prefer-
ences provided by the voters for the pair of alternatives (xi, xj), φ is the 2–tuple symbolic
aggregation mapping (3); and k ∈ [0, m · s) represents the threshold of support required
for an alternative to be the social winner.
The first normative property says that 2TMk–majorities fulfil anonymity, i.e. the
order in which the linguistic valuations of the voters are given is irrelevant for the final
social outcome. The proof is omitted because it is a direct consequence of the arithmetic
mean being commutative.
Proposition 2 (Anonimity). Given a profile of linguistic preferences (l1ij, . . . , l
m
ij ) ∈ Lm,
the following equality holds
2TMk(l
1
ij, . . . , l
m
ij ) = 2TMk(l
σ(1)
ij , . . . , l
σ(m)
ij ).
for any permutation σ : {1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . ,m}.
Example 5. Given the profile of linguistic preferences (l6, l2, l6, l2, l3, l1, l0, l6, l2). Then
we have
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij = (6 + 2 + 6 + 2 + 3 + 1 + 0 + 6 + 2)/9 = 28/9
and
φ
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij
)
= (l3, 1/9) .
These values coincide with the result obtained in Example 4 and therefore it is
2TMk(l6, l2, l6, l2, l3, l1, l0, l6, l2) = 2TMk(l0, l1, l2, l2, l2, l3, l6, l6, l6).
Neutrality means that the aggregation rule should treat alternatives equally, which is
proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Neutrality). Given a profile of linguistic preferences (l1ij, . . . , l
m
ij ) ∈ Lm,
the following equality holds
2TMk(N(l
1
ij), . . . , N(l
m
ij )) = 1− 2TMk(l1ij, . . . , lmij ).
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Proof. We have to prove the following three statements:
1. If 2TMk(N(a
1
ij), . . . , N(a
m
ij )) = 1, then 2TMk(a
1
ij, . . . , a
m
ij ) = 0.
2. If 2TMk(N(a
1
ij), . . . , N(a
m
ij )) = 0, then 2TMk(a
1
ij, . . . , a
m
ij ) = 1.
3. If 2TMk(N(a
1
ij), . . . , N(a
m
ij )) = 0.5, then 2TMk(a
1
ij, . . . , a
m
ij ) = 0.5.
Given a profile of linguistic preferences, (l1ij, . . . , l
m
ij ), expressed in terms of its equivalent
symbolic translation, i.e. (a1ij, . . . , a
m
ij ), we have
2TMk(N(a
1
ij), . . . , N(a
m
ij )) = 1⇔
1
m
m∑
p=1
φ
(
N(apij)
)
> φ
(
s ·m+ k
2m
)
.
Because N(apij) = s− apij (∀ p) then
1
m
m∑
p=1
φ
(
N(apij)
)
> φ
(
s ·m+ k
2m
)
⇔ 1
m
m∑
p=1
φ(s− apij) > φ
(
s ·m+ k
2m
)
.
Recall that function φ is additive, and therefore it is
1
m
m∑
p=1
φ(s− apij) > φ
(
s ·m+ k
2m
)
⇔ φ
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
(s− apij)
)
> φ
(
s ·m+ k
2m
)
.
Therefore we have:
2TMk(N(a
1
ij), . . . , N(a
m
ij )) = 1⇔
1
m
m∑
p=1
(s− apij) >
s ·m+ k
2m
.
Algebraic manipulation of the right hand side of this last equivalence yields:
1
m
m∑
p=1
(s− apij) >
s ·m+ k
2m
⇔ 1
m
m∑
p=1
apij <
s
2
− k
2m
.
Because φ is strictly increasing we have
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij <
s
2
− k
2m
⇔ φ
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij
)
< φ
(
s
2
− k
2m
)
.
Finally, applying again the additivity property of function φ we conclude that
2TMk(N(a
1
ij), . . . , N(a
m
ij )) = 1⇔
1
m
m∑
p=1
φ(apij) < φ
(
s
2
− k
2m
)
⇔2TMk(a1ij, . . . , amij ) = 0.
This proves item 1. The proofs of items 2 and 3 are similar.
Example 6. Given the profile of linguistic preferences (l0, l1, l2, l2, l2, l3, l6, l6, l6), then we
have(
N(l0), N(l1), N(l2), N(l2), N(l2), N(l3), N(l6), N(l6), N(l6)
)
= (l6, l5, l4, l4, l4, l3, l0, l0, l0).
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Moreover,
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij = (6 + 5 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 3 + 0 + 0 + 0)/9 = 26/9
and
φ
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij
)
= (l3, −1/9) .
Notice that φ
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij
)
> φ
(
s ·m+ k
2m
)
never happens, no matter the value of k. On the
other hand, when k < 2 it is φ
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij
)
< φ
(
s ·m− k
2m
)
. Consequently,
2TMk(l6, l5, l4, l4, l4, l3, l0, l0, l0) =
{
0 if k ∈ [0, 2);
0.5 otherwise.
Recalling the result of Example 4, the following holds:
2TMk(l6, l5, l4, l4, l4, l3, l0, l0, l0) = 1− 2TMk(l0, l1, l2, l2, l2, l3, l6, l6, l6).
Monotonicity is proved next. Under this property, the majority value does not de-
crease when the individual linguistic preference evaluation of a profile increase.
Proposition 4 (Monotonicity). Given two profiles of linguistic preferences, (l1ij, . . . , l
m
ij )
and (l
′1
ij , . . . , l
′m
ij ), such that it holds that l
p
ij ≥ l
′p
ij (∀p) then:
2TMk(l
1
ij, . . . , l
m
ij ) ≥ 2TMk(l
′1
ij , . . . , l
′m
ij ).
Proof. Recall that both function φ and the arithmetic mean are increasing, and therefore
denoting lpij ≡ φ(apij) and l
′p
ij ≡ φ(a
′p
ij) we have
lpij ≥ l
′p
ij (∀p)⇒
1
m
m∑
p=1
φ(apij) ≥
1
m
m∑
p=1
φ(a
′p
ij),
which proves that
2TMk(l
1
ij, . . . , l
m
ij ) ≥ 2TMk(l
′1
ij , . . . , l
′m
ij ).
Example 7. Given the profile of linguistic preferences (l3, l1, l2, l2, l2, l3, l6, l6, l6). We have
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij = 31/9
and
φ
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij
)
= (l3, 4/9) .
Because φ
(
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij
)
> φ
(
s ·m+ k
2m
)
when k < 8, it is
2TMk(l3, l1, l2, l2, l2, l3, l6, l6, l6) =
{
1 if k ∈ [0, 8);
0.5 otherwise.
Consequently,
2TMk(l3, l1, l2, l2, l2, l3, l6, l6, l6) ≥ 2TMk(l0, l1, l2, l2, l2, l3, l6, l6, l6).
23
The weak Pareto property presented below, asserts that the result under the rule has
to respect unanimous profiles.
Proposition 5 (Weak Pareto). The following equalities hold:
1. 2TMk(ls, . . . , ls) = 1.
2. 2TMk(l0, . . . , l0) = 0.
Proof.
1. We have
1
m
m∑
p=1
φ(s) = φ(s) > φ
(
m · s+ k
2m
)
∀k ∈ [0,m · s),
and therefore
2TMk(ls, . . . , ls) = 1.
2. We observe that (l0, . . . , l0) =
(
N(ls), . . . , N(ls)
)
. Thus, the proof of this case is
obvious from case 1 above and Proposition 3.
Example 8. Given the profile of linguistic preferences (l6, l6, l6, l6, l6, l6, l6, l6, l6) then we
have
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij = 6 and φ
(
1
m
∑m
p=1 a
p
ij
)
= (l6, 0) . This is the highest collective preference
valuation possible, and therefore it will be
2TMk(l6, l6, l6, l6, l6, l6, l6, l6, l6) = 1 ∀k.
Finally, the cancellative property is proved. Given two profiles with the same linguistic
labels but two of them, then if the additions of the symbolic translations of the differing
linguistic labels in each profile coincide, then the social majority is the same for the two
profiles.
Proposition 6 (Cancellative). Given two profiles of linguistic preferences, (l1ij, . . . , l
m
ij )
and (l
′1
ij , . . . , l
′m
ij ), such that
lhij = l
′h
ij ∀h 6= o, q; loij 6= l
′o
ij , l
q
ij 6= l
′q
ij with l
o
ij + l
q
ij = l
′o
ij + l
′q
ij
then
2TMk(l
′1
ij , . . . , l
′m
ij ) = 2TMk(l
1
ij, . . . , l
m
ij ).
Proof. Notice that lhij = l
′h
ij ∀h 6= o, q; loij 6= l′oij , lqij 6= l
′q
ij with l
o
ij + l
q
ij = l
′o
ij + l
′q
ij implies
1
m
m∑
p=1
φ(apij) =
1
m
m∑
p=1
φ(a
′p
ij).
Example 9. Given the following two profiles of linguistic preferences
(l3, l1, l2, l2, l2, l3, l6, l6, l3) and (l0, l1, l2, l2, l2, l3, l6, l6, l6), then we have
1
m
m∑
p=1
apij = 28/9
and φ
(
1
m
∑m
p=1 a
p
ij
)
= (l3, 1/9) , for both of them. Therefore,
2TMk(l3, l1, l2, l2, l2, l3, l6, l6, l3) = 2TMk(l0, l1, l2, l2, l2, l3, l6, l6, l6).
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6. Conclusion
‘Democratic theory is based on the premise that the resolution of a matter of
social policy, group choice or collective action should be based on the desires or preferences
of the individuals in the society, group or collective.’ This quotation from Fishburn [10,
page 3] fully justifies the use of preferences in social choice. However, democracy is
recognised when decisions are made applying majority voting rule, which in its simple
formulation means that the side with the most votes wins, whether it is an election,
the select of the best candidate for a job when judged by a panel of experts, etc. This,
however, is not the only majority rule available for social policy, group choice or collective
action. Depending on the gravity or importance of the decision to make, other rules such
as unanimous, absolute and qualified majorities may be more appropriate. These rules are
easy to understand when each vote counts the same. However, there are many practical
situations when this is not the case specially when experts or voters are allowed to indicate
their degree of preference, which might be the case for example when selecting candidates
for a job at a company. In these cases, it is possible to apply a new type of majority rules
that are known as majorities based on difference in support, which allow to calibrate the
amount of support required for the winner alternative by means of a difference of intensity
of preference fixed before the election process. Majorities based on difference in support
are defined when preferences are expressed quantitatively. This paper, however, deals
with the comparison of two alternatives at a time and the experts or voters are allowed
to express their preferences using qualitative ratings rather than quantitative ratings, a
practice that is widely extended, for example, in market research for the introduction of
new products by companies. This is because individuals, no mater their background, feel
more comfortable using words to articulate their preferences than using numbers. In this
context, the aim of this paper was to fill the gap between majorities based on difference
of votes and majorities based on difference in support by providing new majority rules
based on difference of support in the linguistic framework.
Linguistic majorities with difference in support extend majorities based on difference
of votes from the context of crisp preferences to the framework of linguistic preferences.
These linguistic majorities have been formalised for the two main representation method-
ologies of linguistic preferences: the cardinal, based on the use of fuzzy sets; and the or-
dinal, based on the use of the 2–tuples. It has been proved that both representations are
mathematically isomorphic when fuzzy numbers are ranked using their respective cen-
troids, and therefore it can be concluded that the cardinal approach constitutes a more
general framework to model linguistic majorities with difference in support. Finally, a set
of normative properties have been demonstrated to hold for the new linguistic majorities.
Some interesting extensions are left opened. Among them, the study of the collec-
tive consistency of linguistic majorities with difference in support when more than two
alternatives are compared [28], and the development of a consistency based selection pro-
cess seems to be worth further investigation. Also, it seems interesting to explore softer
approaches to linguistic majorities with difference in support when the information is
represented using fuzzy sets. Both research issues mentioned here could be addressed by
developing an alternative methodology to the use of a representative crisp number more
consistent with the fuzzy nature of the linguistic information. A potential avenue to
investigate could be the construction of a collective fuzzy preference structure [12] on the
set of alternatives to represent the fuzzy linguistic majority with difference in support.
Finally, the use of type–2 fuzzy sets also seems to be a challenging issue that deserves
future research effort [17, 18],which can be an appropriate representation model of prefer-
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ences when different experts provide their information using sets of linguistic labels with
different cardinality, a case that happens when experts have different levels of expertise.
An alternative approach for this last scenario, which deserves further research, would be
the application of aggregation operators able to aggregate fuzzy number not necessarily
from the same set of linguistic labels, such as the type–1 OWA operator [6, 46].
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